On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-communist Countries - Political Elites in the Eastern European Political Regimes After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: An Interdisciplinary Methodological Approach by Voinea, Camelia Florela
www.ssoar.info
On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-
communist Countries - Political Elites in the
Eastern European Political Regimes After the Fall of
the Berlin Wall: An Interdisciplinary Methodological
Approach
Voinea, Camelia Florela
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Voinea, C. F. (2017). On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-communist Countries - Political Elites in the Eastern
European Political Regimes After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: An Interdisciplinary Methodological Approach. European
Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 6(4), 14-37. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-54495-5
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
  
 
Corresponding Author:  Dr. Camelia Florela Voinea, Associate Professor, Director of the European Research Center for Political Culture 
Affiliation: University of Bucharest, Department of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies                                                                                         
Address: #8, Spiru Haret Street, Bucharest 010175 
e-mail: camelia.voinea@fspub.unibuc.ro  
 
Copyright @ 2017, Camelia Florela Voinea 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities - EQPAM, Volume 6, No.4, October 2017, pp. 14-37. 
 
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN–L 2285 – 4916 
 
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities EQPAM  
Volume 6, No.4, October 2017 
                  ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                  ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
 
Page 14 
On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-Communist Countries 
Political Elites in the Eastern European Political Regimes after the Fall of the Berlin Wall:  
An Interdisciplinary Methodological 1 Approach
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Camelia Florela Voinea 
European Research center on Political Culture 
Department of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies 
Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Romania 
 
Date of submission:  September 12th, 2017                   Date of acceptance: October 23rd, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract  
This paper presents interdisciplinary methodological research concerning the emergence and dynamic 
behavior of elites in the democracies in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The research on 
political elites has been mainly guided so far by the interest in their origins, characteristics, functionalities, 
and political roles. These studies have raised several methodological questions concerning the collection of 
data on the political elite, and the validity and reliability of the survey data. Our approach focuses instead on 
a complexity-based approach by studying the social and political generative mechanisms which could 
illustrate elites’ emergence and dynamics. To this goal, we introduce a research methodology based on 
simulation and agent-based modeling which (i) constructs an artificial polity, and (ii) investigates the elites’ 
influence on the artificial polity’s outcomes. This type of approach enhances the study of some issues which 
are too complex to be studied by classic analytical and empirical means, like the emergence and self-
organization of (political) elites as context-dependent and path-dependent phenomenon in the Central and 
Eastern European post-communist societies. After the 1990s, the democratization processes in these 
countries have often been questioned for their poor capacity to overcome the privilege-generating 
mechanisms which have affected the newly-constructed democratic institutions. Our approach identifies the 
privilege-generative mechanisms aimed to obtain and retain power in the post-communist polities in Eastern 
and Central Europe. The methodological issues approached in this experimental setting are concerned with 
(a) the construction of the context as an artificial polity, (b) the generation of the elites, and (c) the study of 
their dynamics.  
Keywords: elite, agent-based modeling, artificial polity, artificial society 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International License. 
                                                     
1 This paper is a revised version of the paper accepted at the ECPR General Conference in Oslo, Norway, 6 – 9 September 
2017, Section S35: Methodological Challenges in Researching Elites; Panel P107: Elite Emergence and Behavior, available 
online on the website of the ECPR General Conference Oslo 2017 (abstract , full paper ). 
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1. Introduction 
Our model combines political methodology, political science and political culture theories in studying the 
impact of political elites on the operational dynamics of a polity, especially of the typical Central and 
Eastern European polity after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Developed as a part of a large research project on 
Artificial Polity simulation modeling (Voinea, 2017), the elite issue has been emphasized by the 
particularities of the democratization phenomena in the CEE countries after 1989. The role played by the 
elites in the demise of the communist regimes in the CEE countries is subject to study but also to 
controversies. However, the impact of the elites on the democratization process is undoubtedly essential 
for understanding the transitional processes, the different quality of the democracy, and the degree of 
consolidation of democracy reached by different countries in the eastern half of Europe after the fall of the 
iron curtain. Our approach provides a systematic approach on the elites by employing the Artificial Polity 
Model (APM, from now on) for explaining the role of the elites in the dynamics of the CEE democratic 
polities.  
Both elite and polity issues have been approached in the past two decades with the aim of 
evaluating and explaining the role of the elites in the demise of the communist regimes and in the complex 
democratization processes which have followed it. Along with the transition to democracy and the 
democratic consolidation processes, the CEE regimes have been decisively impacted by corruption 
phenomena like political clientelism, patronage, and state capture (Voinea, 2015). In many countries, 
research on democratization has necessarily focused on these issues too, some authors trying to identify a 
relationship between (political) elites and the dynamics of political corruption phenomena in Serbia, Bosnia, 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Romania. In many cases, the modeling approaches have been mainly 
theoretical, focusing on the essential aspects characterizing both polity and elite in the unfolding of the 
political change phenomena.  
There are several authors who revise classic elite theories in order to achieve new theoretical 
perspectives and shed light on the role elites played in the major political change phenomena during the 
1990s and afterwards (Field, Higley and Burton, 1990; Higley and Burton, 1998; Higley and Lengyel, (Eds.), 
2000; Dogan, 2003). Other authors focus, identify and explain mainly the phenomena specific to the 
Central and Eastern European post-communist countries which involve the role of elites and their influence 
on the type and performances of democratization processes in these countries (Steen, 1997; Szeleny, Eyal 
and Townsley (Eds.), 1998; Adam and Tomsic, 2002; Adam, Kristan and Tomsic, 2009; Lengyel and 
Ilonszki, 2010, 2012). These works have provided a rich basis for the experimental setup and the 
simulations reported in this paper. 
As one of the elites’ essential characteristics consists in their capacity of decisively influencing the 
operation and the outcomes of a polity, our paper presents a methodological contribution to the research 
concerning the typology, behavior and dynamics of the elites: this methodological approach is based on an 
artificial polity, that is an agent-based system able to simulate the operation and the dynamics of a real 
polity. The main aim of this paper is to provide a systematization of the findings concerning elite simulation 
modeling from the polity modeling research project2. The Artificial Polity Model (Voinea, 2013b, 2017) has 
been employed for explaining some of the most relevant political phenomena in the CEE countries after 
                                                     
2 The research project has been initiated within the framework created by the EEEW-PAM’2012 in the UEFISCDI exploratory 
workshop project PNII-IDEI/WE_PN-II-ID-WE-2012-4-046/2012 conducted by the Author, and has been developed ever since in 
the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Romania. 
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1989: political corruption and political clientelism (Voinea, 2013a), transition from the communist 
autocracies to democracy in Eastern Europe (Voinea, 2014), and state capture (Voinea, 2015). Each of 
these approaches has provided a perspective over the role played by the elites in the real polities, on the 
one hand, and a research dimension in developing an artificial polity model. 
APM aims to explain several elite phenomena in terms of the relationship between elite action and 
polity outcomes: elite influence on the polity operations, elite internal relationships and struggle for power, 
elite settlements, and elite convergence. Among these phenomena, the democratization processes in the 
Eastern Europe brought to the attention of the research communities some particularities which appear as 
key factors in understanding where are the Eastern European democracies heading to.  
One such particularity is the phenomenon of simulated democracy (Lengyel and Ilonszki, 2010, 
2012) which especially concerns the Eastern European elites after 1989: as the authors present in detail 
this phenomenon, it essentially consists in a qualitative difference between elite’s claims and their actual 
political behavior. Put it in other words, the simulated democracy appears as a political phenomenon which 
concern the political elite’s claims concerning the assumed democratic principles and democratic behavior 
at both individual and institutional level, while such claims are not acknowledged by the public perception, 
nor are they supported by the outcomes of the evaluations of both individual and institutional democratic 
performances and operation. After the demise of communism, in the CEE new democracies it is often the 
case that both political elites and the democratic institutions prove to operate in dissonance with the 
established democratic principles. Political corruption, among others, is considered to be a major source of 
the simulated democracy phenomenon at both political elite level and at the political institutional level.  
Another phenomenon is the elite settlements at different, but relevant periods of time in Eastern 
Europe, like the 1990s and the years between 2005-2010 which have been dominated by the economic 
and financial crises.  
Finally, our interest goes to a third phenomenon, the so-called elite convergence, which appears as 
a desirable outcome of the elite action in the democratization of the Eastern Europe. 
The interest in elite studies comes from the need to understand some of the essential aspects of the 
democratization and of the type and quality of democracy in the Eastern Europe after the fall of the iron 
curtain and especially in the actual context, hardly dominated by the efforts to reform the EU and the efforts 
to face the most relevant challenges of our times: massive migration, refugees condition, dynamics of the 
world economic and military powers, and terrorism. Elite simulation modeling brings forth research issues 
which could only be approached in interdisciplinary frameworks at both conceptual and operational levels. It 
could also help in understanding the political and social phenomenology of society and polity change in 
terms which go far beyond the explanative power of the classic analytical approaches. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a general perspective over the elite concept 
and theories thus establishing the research theoretical framework of our agent-based simulation modeling 
approach with a special focus on the research literature and authors mainly concerned with the elite 
modeling. The general details of the conceptual framework are further clarified in the subsections as 
follows: Subsection 2.1 presents the new elite paradigm as the inspiring research literature source and the 
conceptual support for our modeling approach. Subsection 2.2 specifies the elite definitional perspective 
adopted in this paper as support and framework for the methodological goal of the paper. Subsection 2.3 
states that the elite in the CEE countries and the role they played in the demise of communism and the 
transition to democracy as one of the main interests of the research reported in this paper. Subsection 2.4 
makes a brief review of the elite modeling research literature with the aim of describing the relevance of the 
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methodologies and technologies provided by the sciences of the artificial in the simulation-based modeling 
research developed lately within the areas of social and political sciences. Section 3 describes the 
methodological goals of this approach by describing the Artificial Polity Model (Voinea, 2014; Voinea, 2017) 
and its role in the development of elite simulation modeling research. Section 4 identifies and briefly 
explains the research questions which have driven the development of our elite simulation modeling 
approach. Section 5 makes a detailed presentation of the Artificial Polity Model so that the reader could 
better understand why? and how? this model has been employed in the elite simulation modeling studies 
reported in this paper: subsection 5.1 describes the definitional approach from an operational point of view, 
subsection 5.2 briefly describes the conceptual model of the Artificial Polity, subsection 5.3 describes the 
dynamic space of the elite simulation model, subsection 5.4 describes the operational aspects of the 
relationship between elite and polity in our approach. Section 6 provides technical details on the operational 
description and workings of the elite agents in the simulation model. Section 7 describes early elite 
simulation modeling experiments by providing details on the briberyscape model (Voinea, 2013b) and the 
modifications needed to transform it into an elite simulation model. Section 8 describes ongoing research 
on elite simulation modeling by reporting the advanced experimental setup based on a more complex 
version of the artificial polity model. Section 9 draws several conclusions from the elite simulation modeling 
experimental research and identifies future developments of the current artificial polity model as a complex 
simulation tool with relevant explanative power in elite research. 
 
 
2. Elite: Concept, Theory, Modeling  
Elite theory has been introduced by the classic works of Vilfredo Pareto (1961, 1991, 2013), and Gaetano 
Mosca (1939/2011). Since then, elite theory has been revisited and enriched with new approaches by 
several authors, among whom Michels (1912/1962) is the most relevant author to our study. Our approach 
has been mainly inspired by the new elite paradigm as defined by John Higley and his collaborators 
(Higley, 2008; 2014; Higley and Pakulski, 2012; Field, Burton and Higley, 1990; Higley and Burton, 1987, 
1997; Higley and Lengyel, 2000; Lengyel and Higley, 2006).   
 
2.1 Elite Concept and the Classic Modeling Approaches 
The new elite paradigm (Higley, 2008) as it is addressed in our approach allows for the operationalization 
of elite behavior and the role elites played in the workings of the state.  
The new elite paradigm has provided support to the project’s aim of modeling the impact of elites on 
the polity outcomes before and after the fall of the iron curtain. Elite modeling could thus provide for a better 
understanding of the post-communist societies of the Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
2.2 The Concept of “Elite”: The Definitional Perspective 
In our approach, the notion of “elite” is defined in conformity with the new elite paradigm concepts: 
  
“Elites may be defined as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal 
organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially”  
(Higley, 2008)  
 
Following the new elite paradigm as introduced by John Higley and collaborators, we have 
considered a fundamental elite characteristic, namely the type of the elite-generative source in the polity 
architecture. As generative sources we consider the political parties, electoral and state-command 
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structures, business and banking institutions, intellectual and academic, military, social and civic 
organizations. This approach has provided enhanced support to our polity simulation studies which cover 
several types of political regimes: autocratic, semi-democratic (electoral democracy) and liberal democracy. 
Considered altogether with the ideological attribute of the political elite, this characteristic helps in the 
proper operationalization of elite behavioral tendencies which count most in the emergence of elite 
settlements, transformations, and convergence (Burton and Higley, 1987; Higley, 2008). 
 
2.3 Elites in the Central and Eastern European Countries 
One relevant characteristic of the old elites in the CEE countries (former nomenklatura) in the years 
after the fall of the iron curtain consists in their capacity to penetrate the political party systems after the 
demise of communist regimes. Several authors studied the roles they played in the CEE countries and their 
influence on the development of market economy. Another distinctive characteristic is that the members of 
the former nomenklatura in the CEE countries have succeeded after the 1990s to achieve high social, 
political and economic statuses (i.e., members of the Parliament, Government, courts, political parties, 
etc.). Moreover, they deliberately tried (and many have succeeded) to hide or change their true ideological 
identity and claim to have a different ideology, one closer to liberal principles and oriented toward the 
center ideologically-situated political parties. This phenomenon of transformational ideological identities 
allowed them to “simulate” attachment to democratic principles, parties and economic programs. However, 
latter behavior proved that many of them used this strategy to break democratic norms and rules for taking 
personal benefits or obtain personal or group privileges. Lengyel and Ilonszki have introduced a new 
concept, called “simulated democracy” (Lengyel and Ilonszki, 2010; 2012) which describes this 
phenomenon:  
 
“[…] introduced the notion of “simulated democracy” as an analogy to Lajos Leopold’s “simulated capitalism”. 
This describes a situation in which the institutions of democracy are working, but with a low level of 
efficiency, because the elites and important social groups systematically violate the democratic norms. In line 
with the new elite paradigm, we also claim that it is largely the responsibility of the governing elite whether 
the democratic institutions are consolidated in their “working form”, or whether they remain in a state of 
simulation, gradually reduced to bare facades and institutional skeletons.”  
(Lengyel and Ilonszki, 2010) 
 
2.4 Elite Modeling: Brief Methodological Research Literature Overview 
Political elite simulation modeling could be identified in various approaches covering various qualitative and 
theoretical issues from decision-making to conflict emergence. Not all such models are explicit elite 
modeling approaches, much of them are approaches on the ruling elites as pressure groups or interest 
groups3. Classic methodological approach in elite studies is based on empirical analysis and survey data 
(Hoffmann-Lange, 1985) and the advanced analysis methods like, for a good example, those based on 
sequence analysis (Jackle, 2015). Other authors approach the elite modeling from a mathematical and 
computational perspective aiming at analyzing the impact of the ruling elites in situational contexts 
(Gabbay, 2013). 
Agent-based polity simulation modeling is not a new type of approach as the first attempts belong to 
Cederman (1997) and Axelrod (1997): both authors have actually designed artificial polities as agent-based 
systems interacting with each other in dynamic contexts. Though initially oriented toward explanations of 
                                                     
3 For a detailed classification of the existing elite modeling views, see: Gilens and Page, 2014. 
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conflict emergence, polity simulation modeling has addressed many other research issues concerning the 
state as a political organization, like corruption, political clientelism, oligarchy, and inequality. 
Artificial polity simulation modeling research has been properly introduced by Claudio Cioffi-Revilla 
and his collaborators, who developed several models able to explain the emergence and evolution of 
polities in different ancient geopolitical areas, the structure and the structural dynamics of a polity or the 
emergence of conflict: SimPol Model (Cioffi-Revilla, 2009), and RebeLand Model, Cioffi-Revilla and 
Rouleau, 2010) are among most relevant approaches to artificial polity simulation. Other approaches 
combine agent-based modeling with theories of political sociology, political economy or social complexity 
with the aim of operationalizing issues like decision-making in political regimes (Riolo et al., 2002), security 
issues (Axelrod, 2004), political hierarchies and identity (Lustick et al., 2010), oligarchs’ ideology and their 
influence on political decision-making (Wright and Sengupta, 2015), interests groups (Johnson, 1998), 
voting in artificial political societies (Mitsutsuji, 2012), political elites and their role in the emergence  of 
national states (Cederman, 1997; Cederman and Girardin, 2007), and conflict emergence (Epstein and 
Axtell, 1996; Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009, 2015; Lang and DeSterck, 2012)4.  
 
 
3. Simulation-based Elite Modeling: Our Approach 
Simulation-based modeling is defined and employed by the disciplines at the border between social 
sciences, computer sciences, and the sciences of the artificial, like Social Simulation, Computational 
Sociology, and Computational Economy.  Before defining the artificial polity, one might need to make a 
conceptual difference between the terms we use in this paper, like “simulation”, “simulation-based 
modeling” and “agent-based system”, on the one hand, and some of the terms already introduced in the 
sections above, namely the “simulated democracy”, on the other hand. While the terms “simulation”, 
“simulation-based modeling” and “simulated behavior” employed in modeling research concern a specific 
research methodology, namely the modeling based on artificial (software) agents and systems, the term 
“simulated democracy” concern a qualitative characteristic of the political behavior of a specific social 
segment, the political elite in this case. While the methodologic term of “simulated behavior” concerns a 
specific technology of the artificial systems (that is, agent-based systems which simulate the behavior of 
real social systems) able to explain the behavior of an artificial system, the qualitative term “simulated 
democracy” concern a (deliberately) assumed political behavior which falsifies the claim of democratic 
behavior. 
 An artificial polity can be defined as an agent-based system which reproduces by computational 
means the organization (structure and operation) of the state. As the architecture of this agent-based 
system is designed, the relationships between individual agents (citizens) and institutional agents 
(institutions) are defined and made operational. Such a computational system actually models the 
organization and operation of a real state. It is used to simulate (that is, to reproduce the behavior of a real 
system in the computational environment by means of computational design, resources and technologies) 
the operation and behavior of a real state: each run simulates the operation of the state for a specific period 
of time (simulated time). The outcomes of these simulations are then analyzed so that the designed 
architecture (structure, relationships and operation) could be evaluated and compared with the 
performances, operation and outcomes of real state.  
                                                     
4 For an extended presentation of polity modeling by agent-based models, see Chapters 17-20, in: Voinea, C.F. (2016) Political 
Attitudes: Computational and Simulation Modeling, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Chichester, UK. 
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The Artificial Polity Model (Voinea, 2017) has been applied for the operationalization, modeling and 
simulation of the concepts of elite and elite variability as defined by John Higley (2008), elite settlements as 
defined and described by Michael Burton and John Higley (1987), and the concept of simulated democracy 
as defined and described by  Gyorgy Lengyel and Gabriella Ilonszki (2010, 2012). 
Early agent-based simulations of polity and elites provided insight in elite operational definition and 
operational design (Voinea, 2013a), while currently developed simulation experiments provide insight in the 
design of the polity-elite relationship with the aim of explaining the type and dynamics of the democratic 
regimes in the CEE countries after 1989 (Voinea, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2017). 
 
 
4. Agent-Based Elite Simulation Modeling: Research Questions 
The class of elite simulation models described in this paper is aimed at providing answers to the following 
research questions: 
(i) How to achieve an agent-based operational description, distribution and configuration of 
political and non-political elites? – The modeling approach presented in this paper employs an 
attributional description of typical elite agent’s characteristics. 
(ii) Operationalization of the relationship between elite and polity: The attributional description 
includes both type, and task, action, communication characteristics. It helps identifying the 
different types of elites (political, business, academic), discriminating between their power 
positions (i.e., state-command, economic, academic, other), and studying the dynamics of their 
influence on the polity (institutional) outcomes (i.e., priority, control). 
(iii) Define measures of the efficiency of (i) elites’ influence on the polity outcomes, (ii) elite 
settlements. 
 
 
5. The Artificial Polity Model: A Political Methodologic Research Approach to Elite Study 
As an alternative to the classical modeling approaches developed by means of rich and diverse survey 
data, our modeling approach employs the simulation based on artificial agents. Modeling the state as an 
artificial polity is one important option in achieving a general goal, namely the polity operational 
architecture, and a specific goal, that of explaining the post-communist Central and Eastern European 
political regime dynamics. 
The main idea is to model the polity with an artificial system including (a) an artificial society, (b) an 
artificial state, and (c) an artificial political culture. Comparative analysis between the classic artificial 
territorial model and the artificial polity model as introduced in our paper reveal that the former explains 
emergence of political change by means of conflictual structural components driven by mechanisms and 
processes specifying the nature and evolution of conflict, while the later explains the emergence of political 
change by means of political culture mechanisms and processes.  
Classic approaches define the “polity” as a geographically-situated macro agent and simulates its 
operation with an agent-based system (SimPol Model: Cioffi-Revilla, 2009; RebeLand Model: Cioffi-Revilla 
and Rouleau, 2010).  
As a difference from the RebeLand Model, Artificial Polity (APM) models the reaction of the general 
population toward public policies at the political culture level by means of the individual agents’ political 
attitudes toward the public policy: it simulates the explicit relationship between the operation of a typical 
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polity, on the one hand, and mass political attitudes toward governmental action (public policy), on the other 
hand.  
While inspired by the same concept of basic polity (Almond et al., 2006), the APM model 
approaches the “issue-stress-policy” response cycle in an open polity on a political culture basis: the model 
aims at explaining the dynamics of the relationship between the polity agent (macro agent) and the general 
population agents (individual agents) by value system, political beliefs, political attitudes, and norms which 
could specialize the specification of the polity type: autocracy, democracy, semi-democracy. 
 
5.1 Definitional Perspective 
Anthony Downs has introduced an economic model of democracy (Downs, 1957). Robert Dahl 
defines democracy with the term “polyarchy”, which represents an electoral regime with four main 
components: “universal, active suffrage, universal, passive right to vote, free and fair elections and elected 
representatives” (Dahl, 1989: p.221). Schumpeter (1942) views democracy in the post-autocratic regimes 
as a competition for political leadership based on electoral rules: legitimacy and authority could thus be 
acquired by abusing the electoral rules and the voters’ free choice of political candidates for office. Richard 
Rose identifies the challenges which the ex-communist countries had to face in 1990 immediately after the 
demise of communism: he assumes that state-building and democracy-building would represent a too hard 
problem to be solved simultaneously by the newly-appeared democratic regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the fall of the iron curtain (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998).  
Fuchs and Klingemann (1995), Fuchs, Klingemann and Zielonga (2006), Fuchs and Roller (1998) 
Klingemann (2013), and Wolfgang Merkel suggests a polity conceptual architecture of processes (Merkel, 
2004). This idea allows for the consideration of polity modeling in terms of processes and mechanisms, and 
intensive use of generative data. The classic functional model based on structural components and their 
associated functions is replaced by a dynamic process-based model. This conceptual architecture provides 
for a more general specification of the democratic polity:  it accounts for how a process is generated 
instead of giving an account on what particular component(s) produces or triggers which process. The 
focus shifts from the notion of “function” to the dynamics of the relationships between processes and their 
context.  
While Merkel’s view is explicitly constructivist with respect to a polity model, Welzel’s view upon 
polity modeling is rather implicit: he assumes that there is an interdependence relationship between the 
democratic polity and the citizens’ effective political participation in a real democracy (Welzel, 2013). 
Political culture thus appears as implicitly necessary for an operational approach on the study of the polity 
workings.  
The idea is relevant for approaching the issue of political culture in the domain of polity modeling 
research: it proves the intrinsic relationship between political culture and polity operation. Moreover, it 
shows how to build-up the polity model which could explain the role political culture plays in maintaining 
and evolving the polity as a democracy. 
Our artificial polity-based modeling approach to eite studies builds upon the theories of embedded 
democracy (Merkel, 2004) and human empowerment (Welzel, 2013) and further develops them from an 
operational perspective. As political culture theory has not provided so far for a modeling approach, even 
less for a computational modeling approach, ours tries to suggest a simulation-based one. 
 
5.2 The Conceptual Model 
The model of artificial polity has been inspired by the concept of “embedded democracy” (Merkel, 
2004). In our approach, the polity model combines bottom-up and top-down architectural components into a 
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unitary complex system. Its internal working is specified in terms of processes achieving the essential 
aspects of polity operation: (1) the separation of powers and their interconnection by a system of checks 
and balances, (2) the horizontal and vertical communication in the polity between the political institutions 
and the citizens, and (3) the effective power of governance. 
The architecture of the artificial polity is designed to work as a set of processes called “dynamic 
loops”: their operation is continuous during a simulation run. These dynamic loops describe the 
fundamental processes in any polity, namely the governance, the legislative, the operation of the justice 
system, and the operation of a communication system called generally the “media”. Following the 
conceptual model of an embedded democracy as defined by Wolfgang Merkel, this set of fundamental 
processes also include dynamic loops for continuously checking the separation of powers, elections (see 
Figure 1a).  The outcomes and the internal settings of these dynamic loops are related to one another so 
that they altogether operationally define the model of a state organization under a political regime. In our 
approach, the artificial polity is designed with two generic versions of political regimes: autocracy, and 
democracy. Each version is characterized by the same dynamic loops, however the relationships between 
them as well as their specific outcomes are characteristic for the type of the polity which is simulated. The 
dynamic loops are designed to manage the public issues, that is, issues like policies (i.e., outcomes of the 
governance process), laws (i.e., outcomes of the legislative process) and justice outcomes which impact 
the citizens at the society level, providing for the emergence of complex situations of social unrest or even 
social conflict. The integrated approach of the public issue emergence and management within the 
operation of the artificial polity (Almond et al., 2006) has been already achieved in other models (see the 
SimPol Model, Cioffi-Revilla, 2009): as a difference, our approach achieves this type of dynamics in a 
model based on the concept of embedded democracy.  
This model achieves the operational definition of the elite in terms of the polity structural level 
which they influence (Figure 1b). Elite thus include several structural types: elite which are in state-
command positions (as members of the Parliament, Government, Juridical system and courts), economic 
(business elite), academic, and others. The specifications of the elite types in the experimental settings 
would thus help in achieving the explanation of the role they play in the polity operation in terms of their 
embeddedness in the very structure and workings of the polity. 
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Figure 1.  
Artificial state organization by (a) dynamic loops, and (b) elite types. 
 
 
The bottom-up part of the polity model architecture is constituted by the society component of the 
polity model. This site of the model has a dynamics of its own acquired on the basis of individual agent 
interactions at the social level. The top-down part of the polity model architecture is constituted by the state 
organization on several layers: legislative (Parliament), administrative (Government), justice (Judiciary 
System), and the media5. The processes evolving in this part of the model have operational connections to 
the social layer by means of specific mechanisms. The generic task of any process in this part of the model 
is to control the (emergent) structures at the polity level (macro), and at the society level (micro). The polity 
model operates the entire state as a dynamic entity in a set of connected dynamic loops. The artificial polity 
undergoes a change as its internal process configuration is modified by the elites and/or by the emergent 
structure(s) generated by the collective action(s) of the individual agents at the society level. 
 
5.3 Dynamic Space Model 
In our definition, the artificial polity is a construct which embeds three interaction spaces, that is 
social, political and cultural (Figure 2). The model introduces the embedded dynamic space of a polity 
which is described in terms of interaction spaces: (a) social interaction space (modelled as an artificial 
society), (b) political interaction space (modelled as an artificial polity), and (c) political culture space 
(modelled as an artificial political culture). 
 
                                                     
5 With reference to Figure 1, p.37 in: Merkel, W. (2004) Embedded and Defective Democracies, Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, 
December 2004, pp.33–58. 
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Figure 2. 
The artificial polity dynamic space includes political, societal and cultural components. 
 
 
One main contribution of our modeling approach consists in defining and operating the dynamic 
loops in political culture terms. A second relevant contribution is the definition and description of agents 
such that “elites” can be operationally defined. The elite agents achieve an attribution-based description in 
terms of features and traits6. The attributional description has been used in the early simulation 
experiments reported in corruption simulation studies (Voinea, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015b). This type of 
operational description provides for a simple description of the polity and elite agents and dynamics. A third 
contribution concerns the achievement of polity dynamics in operational terms: each process in the polity 
definition is described by means of a dynamic loop. The communication between the architectural layers is 
achieved in terms of the emergent issues depending on each dynamic loop describing the fundamental 
processes (architectural layer) in the artificial polity: “policy” (governance dynamic loop), “law” (legislative 
dynamic loop), “rule” (judiciary dynamic loop), and “news” (media communications dynamic loop). 
 
5.4 Conceptual Modeling of the Interdependence Relationship between Polity and Elites 
The artificial polity has an institutional representation: the fundamental institutions are represented 
by means of different types of agents with specific capabilities and assigned tasks.  
The model includes the types of agents: individual and elite agents, institutional agents, and 
resources agents. The elite agents are typical for each layer in the polity architecture: they are assigned to 
the dynamic loops representing the operational description of the dynamic processes which make up the 
polity workings (as described in Figure 1). 
The operational principle is a power struggle: elite aim to achieve and maintain power both in 
relation with elite and with the non-elite agents.  
The model employs several attributes and/or mechanisms which regulate the power struggle 
dynamics during the elite interaction processes: priority (power position), control (operationalized in terms 
                                                     
6 For more details on this technique see Robert Axelrod (1997) The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence 
and Global Polarization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(2), 203-226. 
. 
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of “coercion” for autocratic regimes, and in terms of “legitimacy” for the democratic regimes), and privileges. 
Elites aim at increasing their power by means of (i) increasing their priority (information, property, economic 
resources), (ii) increasing their capacity of controlling domains/institutions, and/or (iii) increasing (the 
number and level of) their privileges. 
 
 
6. Elite Agents: Definition, Description and Operationalization 
There are several types of interacting agents: individual agents, organizational agents (political parties), 
and institutional agents (i.e., institution agents defining institutional powers in a democratic polity, like the 
legislative institution (Parliament), the governance institution (Government), and the judiciary institutions 
(the Courts). 
The computational and operational definition of each type of agent is based on the classes of 
characteristics for each level of interaction and for each type of polity (i.e., autocratic, democratic). 
 
 
Figure 3.  
Agents are identified by an attributional description based on features and traits. 
 
 
In order to model the social, political and cultural aspects of the polity and its dynamics, the general 
structure of the agent includes four classes of features: ideological identity, priority, resources, privileges, 
interaction characteristics (level of interaction, tasks, control area, rules of interaction, level of priority of 
interaction) (Figure 3). 
 
 
7. Early APM Elite Simulations: Experimental Setup 
The APM class of models are implemented in NetLogo7. Early simulations have been developed with an 
APM version in which both the elite and the non-elite agents have an attributional description which helps 
identifying their type and behavioral dynamics. Early APM models, called Briberyscape, Baronscape and 
Privilegescape,  have been employed in the study of political corruption on a political culture basis in both 
autocracy and democracy polity models (Voinea, 2013a). 
                                                     
7 NetLogo © 1999-2016 Uri Wilensky is available in the public domain at: https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. 
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In this early APM version, the experimental setup includes an agent-based system with two structural 
components: an artificial society and an artificial political culture. The artificial polity is implicitly described 
by means of elite types and their associated tasks (see Figure 4). In order to avoid high complexity of the 
experimental settings, the system includes a dichotomic description of the elites: elite and non-elite. The 
elite is described by three types of institutional agents: politicians representing Parliament members, 
bureaucrats representing Government members, and magistrates representing the members of the 
Judiciary system and the courts. The non-elite is represented as citizen (individual) agents at the artificial 
society level.  
The artificial polity is thus designed as a structural system in which (i) different institutional elite 
agents perform institutionally specific tasks, and (ii) individual (non-elite) and institutional (elite) agents 
interact at the society level. Their interaction is described in political culture terms by means of beliefs (trust 
in state) and political attitudes toward the state. The model is aimed to achieve an operationally efficient 
description of the elite agents such that they can influence the polity outcomes and eventually provide for 
polity change. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  
Artificial Polity Model (early version). 
  
 
The model aims to explain the polity change and the relationship between elite and non-elite agents 
in terms of a struggle for power. The non-elite agents are characterized by their belief about the state (trust 
in state) and also by their political attitudes toward the state, where the state is represented by the elite 
agents. At the individual level, the non-elite agents have a restricted access to the public resources, the 
access to the public resources being controlled by the elite. As the resources diminish at the individual 
level, the citizens experience a change in their beliefs with regard to the state (i.e., elite in the state-
command positions): as their access to resources remains restricted and conditioned by the elite in state-
command positions, they prove lower trust in the state. Their belief change provides, in turn, for the  
emergence of a dynamic change in their political attitudes toward the elite. The model employs a cognitive 
dissonance mechanism which explains the polity change in terms of change in the non-elite’s political 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 27 
Camelia Florela Voinea: On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-Communist Countries.  
Political Elites in the Eastern European Political Regimes After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: An Interdisciplinary Methodological Approach 
 
EQPAM Volume 6 No.4 October 2017  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916   
attitudes toward the state. As the polity is controlled at the top institutional level by elites, they decide for a 
polity change which safeguards their power positions. As the degree of trust in state decreases in non-elite 
agents, the elite agents perceive an increase of the pressure at the societal level. As an effect of the high 
levels of social pressure (described in the simulations as low levels of trust in state), the elite agents 
provide for a polity change in terms of political regime change from autocratic (centralized) to a democratic 
(open) regime. 
The emergence of political corruption in simulating elite behavior with the Briberyscape Model is 
explained by the elite behavioral response to a decrease in citizens’ trust in state.  The model explains the 
phenomenology of political corruption in both autocratic and democratic settings. 
 
7.1 Elite Simulation Experiments:  
7.1.1 Elite dynamics in autocracy simulations settings based on the artificial polity model 
The fundamental institutions are controlled by the top (elite) level, which make decisions for the polity 
workings. Both top polity institutions (i.e., legislative, governmental, judiciary and media) and the public 
resources are centralized systems controlled by the elite (i.e., elite in state-command positions). The 
dynamics of the artificial polity is induced by the dynamics of the individual attitudes toward the state: as the 
public resources support the public welfare, the attitude is positive (mid-valued trust-in-state); as the public 
resources diminish quantitatively and the level of public welfare decreases, the attitudes become negative 
and strongly negative (low-valued and very low-valued trust-in-state). The artificial polity operates on the 
dimension of political attitudes of the citizens agents (non-elite agents) toward the state: non-elite change 
from a high level of trust in state to low levels of trust-in-state. This change induces a change in the elite 
behavior, which decide to change the political regime from autocratic (centralized and restrictive) to 
democratic (open and permissive) and allow the free access of the non-elite agents to the public resources. 
(see Figure 5).  
The simulations are performed with an agent-based system in which both elite and non-elite have a 
unitary description (as described in Section 6): the differences are provided by the priority level, that is, the 
elite have higher priority than non-elite and thus get free access to the public resources. Another difference 
is achieved by means of the capacity of control as the elite have higher degree of control over the top 
institutional (polity) level, while non-elite do not achieve any kind of control either on polity outcomes or on 
the public resources. 
 
7.1.2 Elite dynamics in democracy simulations settings based on the artificial polity model 
The fundamental institutions in a democracy achieve the condition of the separation of powers such 
that the elite at the top institutional (polity) level cannot fully control the access of the non-elites to the public 
resources. The simulations are performed with an agent-based system (see NetLogo interface in Figure 5) 
in which elite and non-elite are differentiated by their features of priority and control. The elite influence on 
the polity outcomes are described in political culture terms and context: as non-elite’s political attitudes 
toward the elite change from acceptance to rejection, the elite become corrupt: they accept bribe in 
exchange of the access to public resources. Briberyscape model achieves an explanation of political 
corruption in terms of the struggle for power between elite and non-elite (individual citizens) agents (Figure 
5): the political culture issues, like beliefs and political attitudes are evaluated in order to emphasize the 
dynamics of the relationship between elite and non-elite as well as the polity change process (Voinea, 
2013; Voinea, 2017).  
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Figure 5.  
Artificial Polity Model. 
 The dynamics of the attitudes toward the state of the non-elite agents induce a change in the elite agents’ 
behavior which finally results in the change of the polity type from “autocracy” to “democracy”.  
Interface. (left icons) The agent-based system consists in agents of different types and task assignments: 
elite agents (represented graphically with triangles, squares and stars) and non-elite agents (represented 
graphically with circles). The elite includes institutional agents (governmental, legislative, judiciary) and non-
elite agents (citizens) (interface left side). The model includes public resources to which the access is 
controlled by the elite. The Artificial Polity appears as a virtual space (right icon) in which elite agents 
(bureaucrats, politicians and magistrates) interact with non-elite agents (citizens). The access of the non-elite 
agents to the public resources is controlled by the elite agents. As they interact with each other and with the 
elite agents, the non-elite agents consume their individual resources and need to refresh them by accessing 
the public resource and extracting individual incomes. The access of the non-elite agents to the public 
resources is controlled by the elite agents, who constrain the access. As non-elite agents’ welfare decreases, 
they turn their attitudes toward the state into strongly negative attitudes. 
Operation (simulation-based modeling of a real polity): The relationship between elite and non-elite as well 
as the polity outcomes are modelled in political culture terms (beliefs and political attitudes): as the non-elite 
agents reach low levels of trust-in-state, they change their attitude toward the state from mid-positive to 
strongly negative (orange plots), the elite agents decide to relax the access of the non-elite agents to the 
public resources (blue plots), (see down-left corner plots). 
 
 
7.2 Elite Simulation Performances and Limitations 
Notwithstanding the operational efficiency achieved by means of the attributional elite description, 
the study of elite behavioral dynamics is limited by the reductionist approach in what regards the modeling 
of the relationship between polity and elite dynamics: the model assumes a polity change as a change from 
a political regime to another from a set of two political regimes only (autocracy, democracy). On the other 
hand, the political culture context achieved by means of political belief and attitude toward the elite has also 
induced limitations on the performances and the explanative power of the early version of the Artificial 
Polity Model. Moreover, this early version does not give an account of the struggle for power within the elite 
itself (for example, between the elite in power positions and the elite in opposition), reducing it to the 
struggle for power between elite and non-elite. Elite attributional description also needs substantial 
improvements such that it could allow for the complex description of the elite phenomenology like elite 
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settlements and elite convergence in various types of autocratic and democratic settings: in this early 
version, the model cannot account for the elite dynamics in terms of settlements, negotiations, 
convergence, united or disunited elite, etc.  For these reasons, which belong rather to the political science 
domain of the modeling approach, but also for reasons concerning the computational and simulation 
modeling which belong to the methodology domain of this approach, the elite simulation studies have been 
extended by means of an advanced artificial polity model which proved better performances in tackling the 
limitations emphasized by the early model. 
 
 
8. Advanced Elite Simulations: Experimental Setup and Scenarios 
Artificial Polity Model is an agent-based system whose architecture consists in three structural layers: polity 
layer as the layer describing the political establishment, leadership and institutional architecture, society 
layer describing the societal issues mainly the civic rights and liberties, and the (political) culture layer 
meant to describe the social and political perception of the polity operation and the (tendency for) social 
and political action. The artificial polity model consists in a hierarchy of processes which have both vertical 
and horizontal relationships (see Figure 1). This architecture achieves a better operational description of 
the concept of embedded democracy as defined by Wolfgang Merkel (2004). Advanced versions of the 
Artificial Polity Model have a structural architecture in which elite, non-elite and institutions are described as 
agents, while processes are described as dynamic loops. 
Each dynamic loop is based on a so-called “engine”: the public item. The public items are 
institutional basic outcomes: for example, a public policy (policy item) is provided by the Government, and a 
piece of law (legislative item) is provided by the Parliament.  
A public item is elaborated by the elite in top-institutional positions. A public item may be issued by 
elites in conditions of consensus or lack of consensus and it could provide for the emergence of either 
(partial or full) consensus or conflict amongst elites themselves. Once provided in the public space, a public 
item is evaluated by the individual agents at the society level and it could provide for a decrease of citizens’ 
degree of trust in the institution (Government, Parliament, Judiciary and Courts) which has provided for the 
public item (see Figure 6). In this situation, a public issue (Almond et al., 2006; Cioffi-Revilla, 2009) 
emerges. In case of democratic polity, the Artificial Polity Model models this situation as social pressure, 
that is, the public item stimulates the increase of social pressure up to the limits of social unrest (social 
pressure scenario). In case of autocratic polity, this situation is modelled differently since there are few or 
no political liberties and the individual agents do not overtly react to it unless a major political regime 
change occurs (political change or revolution scenario). 
Depending on the outcome of this dynamic evaluation of the public items at both elite and citizen 
levels, the polity dynamics is influenced such that its outcomes could be changed in ways which could be 
hardly predictable due to the complexity of both context and agents’ description and operation. 
In our approach, the social pressure scenario is approached on a political culture basis in which 
components of the value and belief systems are shared by both the elites and the citizen agents. In the 
democratic polity case, the institutional agents provide for civic and political rights and liberties. The citizens 
are able to improve their capacity of reaction to public items and use their rights and liberties to make the 
elite accept their positions with respect to the public items. The capacity of reaction to elite’s actions (that 
is, public items) is modelled as degree of empowerment, a concept which has been inspired by the concept 
of human empowerment (Welzel, 2013) and the studies on materialist and postmaterialist culture in Eastern 
European societies (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003; Welzel and 
Inglehart, 2009). In this respect, the point the artificial polity model makes by employing the political culture 
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theories concerning the value change at the society and polity levels is that of operationalizing the 
relationship between elite and masses in a democratic polity as a deliberative, participative relationship. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 
Elite circulation becomes elite reproduction if rights and liberties are acquired  
by abuse of law and bribe instead of merit. 
 
 
To this operational aim, the Artificial Polity Model employs an improved attributional description of 
the agents: it includes more features which capture the capabilities of both the elites and the non-elite 
agents to tackle the social pressure by political culture means (Figure 7). The elite agents are differentiated 
by type and perform specific tasks: governance, legislative, justice, media communication. As the 
fundamental institutions in the polity (i.e., represented by the elite agents in state-command positions) 
provide for political liberties and civic rights, the degree of social pressure might increase as the citizens 
perceive and evaluate the public items. 
 
 
Figure 7. 
Extended attributional description of elite and non-elite agents aimed at  
including methodological capabilities of achieving polity dynamics in political culture terms. 
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Social pressure (SP) provides for a complex context which has a decisive influence on the elite 
behavioral dynamics. Elite action is modelled as context-dependent, where the elite action contextual 
factors include several structural components: the type of polity (autocracy or democracy), the degree of 
consensus among the (factions of) elite in power position (elite united or disunited), the level of negotiations 
amongst the elite-in-power and the elite-in-opposition (partial agreement, no-agreement, conflict which 
employs the non-elite agents as resources used in the negotiation process), the level of civic rights and 
liberties in the individual (citizen agent), and the degree of empowerment of the citizen agent. 
In order to tackle the complexity of social pressure context, the model introduces two measures: 
frequency and strength of the social pressure context.  
For approaching the influence of the type of polity (autocratic, democratic) on the elite behavioral 
dynamics, the model introduces two pairs (co-structural) measures of the elite capacity to react to the social 
pressure: elite legitimacy (for the democratic polity) and elite authority (for autocratic and totalitarian polity). 
Artificial polity outcomes are modelled as coercive (autocratic polity) and deliberative-participative 
(democratic polity). Elites’ capacity to influence these outcomes make the subject of the simulation 
scenarios. The simulation modeling architecture includes the modeling of several aspects and dimensions 
which make up some relevant scenarios for the elite studies: (i) the political legitimacy and /or authority as 
a means of achieving and maintaining political power by the elites in the young democracies of the Central 
and Eastern Europe after 1989; (ii) the use of force and types of coercion in both autocratic and democratic 
regimes of the CEE in the context of the emergence of new elite after 1989. 
 
8.1 Elite Behavioral Dynamics in Simulated Democracy Scenarios 
The concept of “simulated democracy” (Lengyel and Ilonszki, 2010, 2012) has been operationalized by 
means of the dynamics of elite’s rule compliance behavior.  
In our experimental scenario, elite break the democratic rules with the aim of achieving and/or 
maintaining power. The operationalization of simulated democracy concept is based on the dynamics of the 
difference between the proportion of elite which comply with the democratic rule, on the one hand, and the 
proportion of the elite which does not comply with the democratic rule but only claims compliance. The 
simulations show the relationship between (a) the loss of legitimacy, and (b) the behavioral tendency of 
democratic rule breaking in elite which experience the loss of political power.  
The simulations with our Artificial Polity Model show that the simulated democracy phenomenon is 
strongly tied to the elite struggle to improve their degree of legitimacy in societies and polities which, on the 
one hand, have a low level of economic development, and, on the other hand, emphasize strong 
attachment to materialist values (Pavlović, 2015; Boda and Medve-Bálint, 2014; Voinea, 2014).  
The low level of human empowerment (Welzel, 2013) induces a low capacity to detect defecting 
democratic behavior. In this context, our model employs a mechanism of value dissonance (Lazic and 
Cvejic, 2007; Gabbay, 2013) which explains how true and fake democrat elite agents emerge and evolve in 
post-communist polity settings.  
 
8.2 Elite Settlements 
Elite settlement is a concept defined by Higley and Burton as: 
 
“[…] broad compromises among previously warring elite factions, resulting in political stability and thus 
providing a necessary precondition for the sustained practice of representative democracy” 
(Higley and Burton, 1987)  
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Elite settlement is operationalized by means of the social pressure concept defined above. The 
difficulty in operationalizing elite settlement reside in the complexity of the circumstances as mentioned by 
the authors, namely the “major crisis” (Burton and Higley, 1986: p.14). Another difficulty resides in the 
characteristics of the elite settlement: the short time of arriving to a settlement, the phases in which a 
settlement occurs (brief initial agreement, longer-term completion), the secrecy of settlement, and “face-to-
face negotiations among leaders of major elite factions” (Burton and Higley, 1986: p.16). 
 Elite settlements emerge as the elite reach consensus with regard to rule compliance, elite identity 
(mutual recognition), and crisis (i.e., social pressure). The most interesting experiments are those 
concerned with crisis situations described in terms of social pressure. In situations of social pressure, elite 
might experience a legitimacy loss. This context allows for the emergence of an elite settlement based on 
the mobilization of non-elite (masses) and/or other types of elite (business elite, political party elite, 
academic elite, etc.). 
In autocratic (totalitarian) regimes, in situations of social pressure generated by a public policy, elite 
settlement might occur with regard to- or on the basis of coercive action. This might result in elite 
maintaining power or in elite losing power and in the emergence of a political regime change.  
 
 
9. Conclusions 
One main advantage of using an artificial polity as a simulation tool and medium is that of reproducing in 
the virtual environment the whole political system: so far, simulation modeling research was focused on 
reproducing the economic (market) systems in the virtual medium. Our approach extends this view by 
constructing a multi-layered polity system: the multiple layers include the political leadership and 
institutions, economy and governance, society and culture. It is only such context that could allow for a 
believable simulation of the roles elites play in the workings, outcomes, performances and dynamics of the 
state no matter what type of political regime and leadership it has. 
Efficiency is provided as increased capacity of reproducing interaction capacity and dynamic 
evolution of political systems under the influence of elites. 
One difficult problem concerns the construction of the groups (factions) of elite agents: the unified 
attributional description achieves good performances in operationalization of the society and culture layers. 
However, elites need to be differentiated on several criteria: elite-in-power vs. elite-in-opposition, political 
elite vs. business elite, political party elites, etc. Moreover, the elite behavioral dynamics needs also to be 
differentiated since elites use different circulation and reproduction paths: while political elites emerge from 
the electoral cycles, other types of elites are not elected, but nominated. Notwithstanding this important 
difference, elites succeed to get power positions and to influence polity outcomes. In a simulation model, 
however, this aspect increases the complexity of the polity dynamic space. 
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